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I. INTRODUCTION: AN APPROACH TO CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE - GENERAL APPLICABLE RULES1
N popular usage, corporate governance refers to the role of the board
of directors, shareholder voting, proxy rights, and other transactions
taken by the shareholders to influence corporate decisions. 2 One key
element in improving economic efficiency is corporate governance. 3 Ba-
sically, it is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 4
Moreover, good practice in corporate governance requires commitment,
professionalism, and above all ethical behavior. 5 It is clear that corporate
governance is not an end in itself,6 but it can be considered the path to
benefit shareholders and to serve the public interest in general.
A clear example of the importance of corporate governance is drawn
*The author is a corporate attorney admitted to practice in Argentina. His personal
e-mail is olivares-caminal@lstcounsel.com.
1. El Derecho or "ED," La Ley or "LL," and Jurisprudencia Argentina or "JA" are
three different collections of case law, comments on judgements and articles in
Argentina. These publications have two ways to be quoted: (i) by date, because
they are published as a newsletter on a daily basis (e.g., ED, March 24, 1973) or (ii)
by volumes, after being published the newsletters are compiled in different
volumes (e.g., L.L. 155-597, which means La Ley, Volume 155, page 597). Note
that La Ley has changed the way of numbering the volumes. Rather than
following subsequent numbering, they are numbered by year and letters (e.g., LL,
1987-D-346, which means La Ley, Year 1987, Volume D, page 346). In addition,
"CNCom." is the acronym of the Commercial Court of Appeals of the City
Buenos Aires, the main court of commercial matters in Argentina. It is divided
into five rooms of three judges each, designated A, B, C, D, and E. Lastly,
"CSJN" is the acronym for the Federal Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina.
2. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 976 (6th Int'l ed. 2000).
3. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., at 11 (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter OECD].
4. A. CADBURY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BRUSSELS, INSTrruUT VOOR BESTUUN-
DERS (1996).
5. LUTGART A.A. VAN DEN BERGHE & LIESBETH DE RIDDER, INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDIZATION OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 5 (1999).
6. Where were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Ca-
nada, TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
CANADA (1994).
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up from research done by McKinsey & Company7 where: "an over-
whelming majority of investors are prepared to pay a premium for com-
panies exhibiting a high governance standard. Premiums averaged 12-
14% in North America and Western Europe; 20-25% in Asia and Latin
America; and over 30% in Eastern Europe and Africa."
Corporate governance could be graphed as a triangle, formed by three
smaller triangles representing: (i) the shareholders and stakeholders; (ii)
the board of directors and managers; and (iii) the auditors and supervi-
sors' inter-relationship. After the Enron crisis and the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,8 the latter has received much preponderance. These
interactions of the three triangles create a fourth triangle in the middle
that reflects the corporate governance. This would not be completed,
however, unless its relation with third parties is considered (i.e., society).
Society Society
Society
In Argentina, there are three primary sources of law and regulation
relating to corporate governance: (1) the Companies Law Number 19,550
as amended and restated (ACL); (2) the Securities Law Number 17,811
(SL); and (3) regulations issued and enforced there under by the Superin-
tendency of Corporations (Inspeccion General de Justicia or IGJ) 9 and
the National Securities Commission (Comisi6n Nacional de Valores or
CNV).1 °
7. McKinsey & Co., Global Investor Survey 2002: Key Findings (July 2002), at http://
www.mckinsey.com.
8. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by the United States Congress on July 25,
2002.
9. The Superintendency of Corporations is Argentina's controlling authority on com-
panies, which depends on the Ministry of Justice as per Law No. 23.315, art. 1.
10. The CNV is an autarkic entity with jurisdiction covering the territory of the Argen-
tine Republic. The CNV was created by the Public Offerings Law No. 17.811. Its
main purpose is to ensure the accuracy of Argentina's securities markets, to watch
over the market price formation process, and to protect investors. The CNV su-
pervises corporations authorized to issue securities to the public, the secondary
markets where these securities are traded, and all persons and corporations in-
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In 2001, the Argentine Government introduced a major reform to the
regulatory framework applicable to the public offer regime. The reform
incorporated the Corporate Governance Principles of the Best Practices
Code of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(Corporate Governance Principles), which were not already incorporated
in the Argentine legal system. Decree 677/01 (Transparency Decree or
TD), which became effective on June 1, 2001, introduced such amend-
ments and implemented the so-called Public Offering Transparency
Regime.
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) created policies by a convention signed in Paris on December
14, 1960. The OECD adheres to three goals. The first goal is to achieve
the highest sustainable economic growth and employment, and a rising
standard of living in member countries1' while maintaining financial sta-
bility, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy.
The second goal is to contribute to sound economic expansion in mem-
ber, as well as non-member countries, 12 in the process of economic devel-
opment. The third goal is to contribute to the expansion of world trade
on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with interna-
tional obligations.
The Corporate Governance Principles of the OECD can be summa-
rized as: (i) rights of the shareholders; (ii) equitable treatment of share-
holders; (iii) role of stakeholders; (iv) disclosure and transparency of
corporations; and (v) responsibilities of the board. 13 The Corporate Gov-
ernance Principles are intended to assist member and non-member gov-
ernments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional,
and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries. In
addition, the Corporate Governance Principles provide guidance and sug-
gestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other parties
that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance.
Lastly, the Corporate Governance Principles focus on publicly traded
companies.
volved in any capacity in the public offering and trading of these securities. Public
offering and trading of futures and options contracts is also under CNV jurisdic-
tion, as are the related futures exchanges, clearing houses, and brokers in-
termediaries. See Comisi6n Nacional de Valores, available at http://www.cnv.gov.
ar/English/Main.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
11. The original member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Other countries that have joined the OECD
include: Japan (1964), Finland (1969), Australia (1971), New Zealand (1973), Mex-
ico (1994), the Czech Republic (1995), Hungary, Poland, and Korea (1996). See
OECD, Member Countries, at http://www.oecd.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
12. Argentina is not an OECD member. See id.
13. See OECD, supra note 4 (including the principles of corporate governance and
their annotations).
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The intention of this article is to analyze the Argentine legal system,
including its incorporation and application of Corporate Governance
Principles.
II. STRUCTURE OF ARGENTINE CORPORATE ENTITIES
The ACL set the rules for the incorporation and performance for the
following corporate legal entities: (i) Sociedad Colectiva; (ii) Sociedad en
Comandita Simple; (iii) Sociedad de Capital e Industria; (iv) Limited Lia-
bility Partnership (Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada or SRL); (v)
Corporation (Sociedad An6nima or SA); (vi) Corporation with a govern-
mental major shareholding; and (vii) Sociedad en Comandita por
A cciones.
In Argentina, the Corporation is the most important corporate form
and is the legal entity generally used to do business.1 4 Consequently, a
broad legal framework has been developed and a large amount of judicial
precedents and administrative resolutions have been passed interpreting
rules or establishing certain applicable principles. Therefore, this com-
ment will focus its analysis of corporate governance rules in Argentina
from the perspective of the Corporation. This notwithstanding, corporate
governance aspects are not limited to the large quoted companies.' 5
The corporation may be incorporated by two or more shareholders,
which may be either national or foreign corporate entities16 or individu-
als. Equity is divided into shares and each shareholder limits its potential
liability to the value of the subscribed shares. Additionally, corporations
are administered by a board of directors. 17 One or more statutory super-
visors appointed at the shareholders' meeting shall be in charge of super-
vising the company. Under section 299 of the ACL, 18 except in respect of
paragraph 2 thereof (when the corporate capital exceeds Argentine Pesos
14. See A. Enrique, SRL, Un Vehiculo Poco Utilizado, 1995 E.D. 1017 (2002); see also
Suplemento de la lnspecci6n General de Justicia 1, L.L. (2000).
15. 0. PASTRE, GOUVERNEMENTD'ENTREPRISE: LES DIX COMMANDMENTS (1996).
16. Likewise, it is important to note that foreign corporations can perform activities in
Argentina through the establishment of a branch office (Law No. 19.550, art. 118),
or can participate as shareholders in domestic companies (for which they must
comply with the requirement of registration with the IGJ in accordance with Law
No. 19.500, art. 123).
17. Although there are some countries that have a two-tier board of directors that
separate the members as executive and non-executives (the first of them being the
"management board" and the latter the "supervisory board"), in Argentina there
only exists a "unitary" board that brings together the executive and non-executive
board members. Under Argentine law, the duty of supervision shall be exercised
by all the directors and shareholders. Besides this per se duty, a special supervisor
or committee can be appointed.
18. In addition to being subject to internal control efforts, corporations shall be sub-
ject to control by the respective authority within their jurisdiction while they are
doing business, at the time of their dissolution and liquidation, and in any of the
following situations:
(i) when they offer shares and debentures to the public;
(ii) when their capital exceeds twenty one billion Australs (Note: as of Jan.
1, 1992, this figure is understood to be 2,100,000 pesos, see sections 1, 2
of Decree No. 2128/91 published in the Official Gazette on Oct. 10,
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$2,100,000), the appointment of the statutory supervisors is mandatory
and shall be comprised by an odd number of members.
In accordance with the by-laws of the corporation, a vigilance commit-
tee comprised of three to fifteen shareholders may be appointed at the
shareholders' meeting. The duties of this committee are very similar to
those of the statutory supervisor. Because the adoption of a vigilance
committee is not mandatory, corporations have not generally adopted
such a committee. Honorus brevatis, we will not refer to the vigilance
committee in this article.
As a general rule, companies making a public offering of their shares
shall create an audit committee comprised of three or more members of
the board of directors, 19 the majority of which shall be independent 2°
pursuant to the criteria established by the CNV.
III. SHAREHOLDERS' MEETINGS, LIABILITY, RIGHTS, AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT
A. SHAREHOLDERS' MEETINGS
Shareholders' meetings must take place at the company's legal domi-
cile (registered office) or within the jurisdiction of its legal domicile,21
and are either ordinary (Asamblea Ordinaria) or extraordinary (Asam-
blea Extraordinaria).
Ordinary meetings must be called at least once a year, within four
months from the end of the fiscal year.22 The meetings consider two ma-
jor categories. 23 The first categories includes financial statements, state-
ments of income, distribution of earnings, board of directors' and
statutory supervisors' reports, and any other measure relative to the cor-
porate business upon which the ordinary shareholders' meeting is compe-
tent to render a decision in accordance to the law or by-laws or other
1991), the amount may be updated by the Executive Branch whenever it
deems necessary;
(iii) when they are mixed-economy companies or when they are corpora-
tions with a major governmental shareholding;
(iv) when they engage in capitalization or savings operations or in any man-
ner borrow money or securities from the public with the promise of fu-
ture services or benefits;
(v) when they work public concessions or services; and
(vi) when it is a company controlling or controlled by another subject to
supervision pursuant to one of the above-referenced provisions.
Law No. 19.550, art. 299.
19. Decree No. 677/01 § 15.
20. The director shall be independent with regard to the company as well as to the
controlling shareholders, and shall not perform executive functions in the
company.
21. Law No. 19.550, art. 233.
22. See notice (circular) no. 69, May 15, 1973 (whereby the IGJ (formerly in that date
Inspecci6n General de Personas Juridicas) settled the interpretation regarding the
timing to summon the shareholders meetings to consider the financial statements.
The first announcement or notice should be published in the Official Gazette and/
or in a leading newspaper within four months from the end of the fiscal year).
23. Law No. 19.550, art. 235.
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issues submitted by the board of directors. The second category includes
the appointment and removal of directors and statutory supervisors, and
performance and liabilities of same.24 Ordinary meetings may also be
called at any moment to consider any increase in authorized capital up to
five times the original amount if it is authorized by its by-laws,25 and
other matters not delegated to extraordinary meetings.
Apart from the matters previously identified, the ordinary meeting in
listed companies shall decide the following: (i) the disposition or encum-
brance of all or a substantial part of the assets of the company when it is
not carried out in the ordinary course of the company's business; and (ii)
entering into the company's administration or management agreements. 26
The extraordinary shareholders' meeting deals with all matters that are
outside the competence of the ordinary shareholders' meeting; and
amendments to the by-laws. In particular, the meetings hear the follow-
ing: (i) the capital increase, except in the case of its authorized increase
up to five times (it may only delegate to the board of directors the power
to fix the time of issue and form and terms of payment); (ii) the reduction
and repayment of capital; (iii) the redemption, reimbursement, and amor-
tization of shares; (iv) the merger, transformation, and dissolution of the
company; (v) the appointment, removal, and remuneration of the liquida-
tors; (vi) the split-up of the company; (vii) the consideration of the ac-
counts and other matters relating to actions taken by the liquidators in
the company's winding-up that require a final resolution of approval;
(viii) the limitation or suspension of the pre-emptive right for the sub-
scription of new shares; 27 (ix) the issuance of debentures and their con-
version into shares; and (x) the issuance of bonds.
Ordinary and extraordinary meetings are held when called by the di-
rectors or statutory supervisors or by shareholders representing at least a
5 percent of authorized capital, unless the by-laws permit a smaller
number.
Notices of meetings are given by means of announcements or notices
published for five days in the Official Gazette, at least ten days in ad-
vance of the date specified for the holding of meeting.28 In addition, cor-
porations referred to in section 299 of the ACL,29 should publish the
following information in one of the leading newspapers in Argentina: the
24. J. M. FARINA, COMPENDIO DE LAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES, 345 (1989).
25. Law No. 19.550, art. 188. Note that although this capital increase has to be regis-
tered, it does not imply a reform to the by-laws. CNCom [152-D] L.L. 455 (1973);
CNCom [155-A] L.L. 400 (1974); CNCom [155-C] L.L. 597 (1974).
26. Law No. 17.811, § 72.
27. It should comply with the requirements set forth in ACL art. 197. Namely, that: (i)
the matter be included on the Agenda, and (ii) the shares in question are to be
paid by contributions in kind or given in payment of previously existing obliga-
tions. Law No. 19.550, art. 197.
28. The "5-day publishing term" of the Official Gazette should be counted as business
working days, while the ten-days in advance of the shareholders' meeting are
counted in a row.
29. See supra note 18.
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nature of the shareholders' meeting; 30 the date, time and place of the
meeting;3' the agenda, and the special requirements demanded by the by-
laws for the attendance of shareholders. However, no publications are
necessary when all shareholders are present and decisions are made
unanimously.32 Moreover, if the required quorum is not available at a
meeting on first call, notice for a meeting on second call, which must be
held within thirty days of the date for which the first meeting was called,
must be given at least eight days before the date of the second meeting.
The by-laws may authorize both meetings (on first and second call) to be
convened by means of the same notice.33 In the latter case, if the meet-
ings are convened for the same day, it must be held within an interval of
not less than one hour.34 Listed companies shall publish notice of a meet-
ing at least twenty days in advance, but not before forty-five days from
the date of the meeting. These terms shall be computed as from the last
publication.
Twenty days before the date established for the meeting, the board of
directors shall place at the shareholders' disposal, in the main office or
through electronic means, all the relevant information with regard to the
meeting to be held, the documents to be considered therein, and the
board of directors' proposals.
Up to five days before the date established for the ordinary meeting
where the documents of the fiscal year shall be considered, the sharehold-
ers representing at least 2 percent of the corporate capital may deliver to
the main office comments or proposals related to the company's business
corresponding to the fiscal year.35 The board of directors shall inform the
shareholders that said comments or proposals are in the main office or
that they may be consulted through electronic means.
Shareholders may be represented at any meeting by proxy.36 A judge,
a public notary, or a bank official must certify signatures of the granting
parties on the proxies. In the event that the proxy has been issued in a
foreign country, a notary public must certify the signature as to the iden-
tity and capacity of the signer, and as to his faculties to grant a power of
attorney on his behalf or on behalf of the grantor company. The docu-
ment should then be legalized following the procedure established by the
30. IGJ's Administrative unpublished decision, Apr. 26, 1973.
31. "Laboratorios Bago S.A." CNCom. [1983-B] L.L. 745.
32. See I. Winizky, paper submitted in the 1st National Congress of Companies Law,
LA CUMBRE (Aug. 1977); E. H. Richard & C. Brizuela, paper submitted in the 1st
National Congress of Companies Law, LA CUMBRE (Aug. 1977); JUAN M. FARINA,
TRATADO DE SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES 181 (1980); see also "Malacari, Bruno c/
Rodrfguez, Amadeo," CNCom. Room D, July 28, 1976, unpublished.
33. See FERNANDO HORACIO MASCHERONI, ASAMBLEA EN LA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA
35 (1987).
34. Law No. 19.550, art. 237.
35. Law No. 17.811, art. 71.
36. Law No. 19.550, arts. 56, 239. IGJ Resolution No. 6/80. See MIGUEL A. SASOT
BETES, LAS ASAMBLEAS 193 (1981); ZALDIVAR ET AL., CUADERNOS DE DERECHO
SOCIETARIO PART 2, Vol. 2, Macchi 362 (1979); A. V. VERON, TRATADO DE
SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES, VOL. I1 709 (1993).
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Hague Convention on the Abolition of Legalization of Documents of Oc-
tober 5, 1961, or at the nearest Argentine Consulate if the country where
the document was signed has not ratified said convention. Nevertheless,
directors, managers, statutory supervisors, and employees of the company
may not represent shareholders.
To attend shareholders' meetings, shareholders must deposit their com-
pany shares or a certificate of deposit or records of non-certificated
shares, issued for that purpose by a bank, securities account or other au-
thorized institution for registration in the ledger of attendance at share-
holders' meetings book no less than three business days prior to the fixed
date. 37 The company will give them due vouchers of receipt, which will
serve for admission to the shareholders' meeting.38
The ordinary shareholders' meeting at the first call requires the pres-
ence of shareholders representing the majority of the voting shares.39 At
the second call, the shareholders' meeting is considered in order irrespec-
tive of the number of shares present. In both cases, resolutions will be
taken by an absolute majority of votes present that may be issued on the
respective decision, 41 except when the by-laws demand a greater number.
The extraordinary shareholders' meeting shall meet at the first call with
the presence of shareholders representing 60 percent of the shares enti-
tled to vote, if the by-laws do not require a greater quorum. The attend-
ance of shareholders representing 30 percent of shares entitled to vote is
required for the second call, unless the by-laws fix a greater or lesser quo-
rum. Resolutions in both cases shall be taken by the absolute majority of
votes present that may be cast on the respective decision, except when
the by-laws demand a greater number.4 1
In the following cases, the extraordinary shareholders' meeting resolu-
tions shall be adopted by the favorable vote of the majority of shares
entitled to vote: (i) the transformation, extension or renewal of the incor-
poration term, except for companies making public offers or quoting their
shares on the stock exchange; (ii) the company's anticipated dissolution;
(iii) the transfer of domicile abroad; and (iv) a fundamental change of the
corporate purpose and total or partial repayment of capital. This provi-
sion shall be applied to decide upon mergers and split-ups, except with
regard to the surviving corporation, which shall be ruled by regulations
governing capital increase.42
B. SHAREHOLDERS' LIABILITY
As a matter of principle, shareholders of local corporations enjoy the
benefit of limited liability because the company is a legal entity indepen-
37. FARINA, supra note 32, at 351.
38. See VERON, supra note 36, at 909.
39. J. 0. ZUNINO, REGIMEN DE SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES 231 (1993).
40. FARINA, supra note 32, at 351.
41. Law No. 19.550, art. 244.
42. Id.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES
dent from its shareholders. A shareholder of a corporation is only liable
for the obligations incurred by the corporation to the extent of the share-
holders' subscribed capital. 43 Such principle is subject to certain excep-
tions. The ACL and the Bankruptcy Law Number 24,522, as amended
and restated (ABL), describe certain scenarios under which shareholders
may be held unlimited and jointly and severally liable for damages caused
to, by or through the company.
1. Unlawful Activities
When a company having a lawful purpose carries out unlawful activi-
ties, it shall be dissolved and liquidated upon the petition of any party or
on the initiative of the IGJ. The shareholders, directors, and supervisors
shall be held unlimitedly and jointly and severally liable for the com-
pany's liabilities and the inflicted damages. 44 They shall also lose their
right to any residual claim because any outstanding balance or asset of
the corporation will become property of the Argentine Government.
Those partners who evidence their good faith shall be excluded from
these provisions.
2. "Disregard of Legal Entity" Doctrine
Section 54 of the ACL provides that shareholders of a local corporation
or those who effectively control it shall be held unlimitedly and jointly
and severally liable if such corporation has been used as a mere vehicle to
pursue goals alien to the corporate purpose, breach the law or the public
order or to impair third parties rights.
The majority of legal authors are of the opinion that for purposes of
applying the disregard of legal entity doctrine it is necessary that the in-
tention (or gross negligence) to inflict damages or breach the law be
clearly evidenced. Recently, a Labor Court of Appeals has applied the
doctrine in cases of breach of social security and tax regulations by means
of hiring or keeping unregistered personnel.4 5 We do not agree with this
criterion 46 since it is clear that it is a breach of duty of the directors in lieu
of the shareholders (if it cannot be proved that the shareholders have
been aware of the unfulfillment) as the court has established.
43. Shareholders with partially paid subscribed shares are required to pay the out-
standing balance within two years from the date of subscription.
44. Law No. 19.550, art. 19.
45. "Delgadillo Linares," CNTrab. Room 111, unpublished, Sept. 11, 1997; "Duquelsy,"
CNTrab. Room Ill, 1999-B, LL, Feb. 19, 1998.
46. In the same line of thinking, see Franciso Junyent Bas, Responsabilidad de los Ad-
ministradores Societarios por Fraude Laboral, in REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO
Y COMUNITARIO 183 (2000); Germfn Luis Ferrer, La Responsabilidad de los
Directores de Sociedades An6nimas y la Inoponibilidad de la Persona Juridica en la
Relaci6n de Empleo "en Negro," in REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y
COMUNITARIO 203-40 (2000).
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3. Willful Misconduct, Negligence or Diversion of Assets
Damage suffered by a corporation due to fraud or negligence 4 7 by part-
ners or by controlling non-partners renders those responsible jointly and
severally liable for the compensation thereof, without being entitled to
offset such compensation with the profits that their action may have pro-
duced in other business dealings. This liability shall also extend to those
shareholders that were aware of the other shareholders actions and failed
to take proper actions to prevent the infliction of damage, even if they
did not participate directly in the scheme. In this case, they shall be held
liable on grounds of omission. A partner or controlling party who applies
funds or assets of the corporation to its own use or business or that of a
third party, is obliged to deliver the resulting profits to the corporation,
and shall bear the losses at his sole expense.
4. Voided Shareholders' Resolutions and Conflict of Interest
Those shareholders who voted for the resolutions that are subsequently
voided because there were illegal (in a broad sense) and caused damages,
and the relevant shareholders acted either with negligence or willful mis-
conduct shall be held jointly and severally liable for all damages arising
from such resolutions, without prejudice to the liability of the directors
and statutory supervisors.48 Moreover, any shareholder with interests in
conflict with those of the company has a duty to abstain from voting on
any matter that relates to such conflict.49 Breach of this provision may
give rise to liability for damages when, without the vote of the party af-
fected with the conflict of interest, the relevant resolution could not have
been validly approved.
5. Extension of Bankruptcy
A first approach to the extension of a bankruptcy proceeding to a third
party requires emphasizing that as a matter of fact it is not granted per se;
hence it is only granted restrictively by the courts. This does not mean
that extension of bankruptcy is never declared. However, in order for the
declaration to be made by the intervening judge, a number of require-
ments that are detailed below have to be met.
Upon the request of the trustee or another creditor within the term
specified by the ABL, the court may render a judgment whereby the
bankruptcy proceeding is extended to another person (Person Subject to
Bankruptcy) in the event that any of the following situations occurs:
(i) Under the appearance of acting for the benefit of the ankrupt en-
tity, 50 such Person Subject to Bankruptcy has performed acts in its
47. As per section 902 of the Argentine Civil Code, the higher the level of care and
prudence that must be kept, the greater the obligations derived from the potential
consequences of the facts.
48. Law No. 19.550, art. 254.
49. Id. art. 248.
50. Assuming it is declared bankrupt.
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own interest and managed the assets of such entity as if such assets
were its property, thereby defrauding its creditors (acting in the
personal interest of the Person Subject to Bankruptcy). 51
(ii) The Person Subject to Bankruptcy, which controls the bankrupt
entity, has managed the business thereof to achieve aims alien to
its corporate purpose, directing the bankrupt entity under a uni-
fied management in the interest of the controlling party or the
economic group to which it belongs (abusing the control of the
bankrupt entity).5 2 The Person Subject to Bankruptcy would be
the bankrupt entity's controlling party if: (a) it is determined that
it directly or indirectly holds an interest, of any nature, in the
bankrupt entity that provides the votes necessary to control the
corporate decisions thereof; or (b) each of the persons that, acting
jointly, have any interest (as described in (a) above), and are liable
for the conduct detailed in (i) above.
(iii) The assets and liabilities of the Person Subject to Bankruptcy and
those of the bankrupt entity may not be distinguished (commin-
gling of funds). 53
The requirements provided in (i) above would be the following: (1)
the pre-existence of a bankruptcy; (2) the determination that another
Person (whether the bankrupt entity's shareholders, directors, manag-
ers, etc., or a controlling company of the bankrupt entity, in fact, the
"owners of the business") act as if they acted on behalf of and for the
benefit of the bankrupt entity; (3) such Person Subject to Bankruptcy
transfers the bankrupt entity's assets as the Person Subject to Bank-
ruptcy's assets and in its own interest; and (4) fraud to the creditors in
general. 54 Therefore, mere ruinous mismanagement by the bankrupt
entity's managers would not suffice.
C. SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
Shareholders enjoy certain rights regardless of their participation in the
capital stock of the company. In section II.C.1, we will describe broadly
all the rights pertaining to all shareholders. In the subsequent part, sec-
tion II.C.2, we will describe the rights pertaining to the shareholders in
accordance to their different shareholding percentages as specified.
1. Rights Pertaining to all Shareholders
o Voting Rights: 55 The first and most important right with which
51. Law No. 24.522, art. 161(1).
52. Id. art. 161(2).
53. Id. art. 161(3).
54. See S. FASSI & M. GEBHARDT, CONCURSOS Y QUIEBRAS 374 (6th ed. 1997). See
also RIVERA ET AL., CONCURSOS Y QUIEBRAS - LEY 24.522 (1995); A. N. ROUL-
LION, RtGIMEN DE CONCURSOS Y QUIEBRAS - LEY 24.522 (1995).
55. This right arises from article 216 of the ACL, whereby each share entitles a share-
holder to one vote. Law No. 19.550, art. 216.
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shareholders are entitled is their voting right to decide on different
matters at ordinary and extraordinary shareholder meetings.
" Cumulative Voting:56 Shareholders have the right to elect up to one-
third of the vacancies to be filled on the board of directors by the
cumulative voting system.5 7 The by-laws may not repeal this right
nor regulate it in such a way as to hamper its exercise, but it is ex-
cluded in the event that the election takes place within different clas-
ses of shareholders. The board of directors may not be renewed
partially or in stages, if this should prevent exercise of the cumulative
voting system.
" Right to be informed in Advance of the Matters to be discussed in
the Shareholders' Meetings: 58 All the matters to be discussed in the
shareholders' meetings must be included in the agenda of the meet-
ing previously published. All decisions on matters other than those
56. Id. art. 263.
57. The following procedure shall be followed:
(i) The shareholder(s) who wish to vote cumulatively must notify the com-
pany within three business days before the date of the meeting.
(ii) The company must inform the shareholder(s) who request concerning
notices received. Without detriment thereto, the president of the
shareholders' meeting must inform shareholders present that they are
all entitled to vote cumulatively, whether or not they have served the
notice.
(iii) Before voting, the number of votes pertaining to each shareholder pre-
sent shall be made known publicly and in detail.
(iv) Each shareholder who votes cumulatively shall have a number of votes
equal to the result of multiplying those he would have normally had by
the number of directors to be elected. He may distribute them or accu-
mulate them among a number of candidates not in excess of one-third
of the vacancies to be filled.
(v) Shareholders who vote by the ordinary or multiple system and those
that vote cumulatively shall compete in the election of one-third of the
vacancies to be filed; the ordinary or multiple voting system being ap-
plied to the remaining two-thirds. Shareholders who do not vote cu-
mulatively will do so for all the vacancies to be filled giving each of the
candidates the aggregate votes corresponding to them according to
their shares entitled to vote.
(vi) No shareholder may vote (dividing his shares for that purpose) in part
cumulatively and in part in the ordinary or multiple system.
(vii) All shareholders may vary the voting procedure or system before cast-
ing their vote, including those who notified their intention to vote cu-
mulatively and fulfilled the requirements for that purpose.
(viii) The result of the voting shall be counted per person. Those candidates
voted by the ordinary or multiple system will only be considered
elected if they receive the absolute majority of votes present; those
candidates voted cumulatively and obtain a number of votes exceeding
those obtained by the ordinary system, until a third of the vacancies is
filled.
(ix) In the event of a tie between two or more candidates voted by the
same system, a further vote shall be taken in which only the sharehold-
ers that opted for that system shall participate. In the event of a tie
between candidates voted cumulatively, the shareholders who, under
the system, have already obtained the election of the candidates that
they proposed shall not vote in the second election.
Law No. 19.550, art. 263.
58. Law No. 19.550, art. 236.
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included on the agenda are null and void, except: (i) when the entire
capital is present and decisions are adopted unanimously by the
shareholders having the right to vote;59 (ii) the appointment of those
who are to sign the minutes; and (iii) when the case the shareholders
decide to file a judicial claim for liability against directors when it is a
direct consequence of a matter already included in the agenda.
* Withdrawal Right:60 Shareholders who dissent with any of the fol-
lowing decisions may withdraw from the company and be reim-
bursed the value of their shares: (i) the extension of the duration
term of the company; (ii) the change of the legal domicile to a for-
eign country; (iii) the fundamental change of corporate purpose; (iv)
the total or partial recapitalization which involve a disbursement by
the shareholders; (v) the merger or split-up when the shares received
in exchange would not be listed; (vi) voluntary delisting of the shares
of the company or withdrawal from public offering regime; or (vii)
the change of form of organization of the company (transformaci6n
societaria, e.g., if a corporation transforms into a limited liability
partnership). Shares shall be reimbursed at the value stated in the
most recent balance sheet drawn up or that should be drawn up in
compliance with legal provisions or regulations.
Shareholders of companies that offer their shares to the public or are
authorized to have them quoted on the stock exchange may not exer-
cise the right of withdrawal in the event of a merger or split-up, if the
shares that they are to receive as a result of such merger or split-up
are authorized to be offered to the public or quoted on the stock
exchange. They may exercise such right if registration under those
systems is withdrawn or rejected.
The right of withdrawal may only be exercised by those shareholders
present at the meeting who voted against the resolution within the
fifth day of such vote, and by those absent shareholders who evi-
dence their standing as such at the date of the meeting, within fifteen
days after it has been held. In such situations, the term shall be
counted from the time when the company announces the withdrawal
or rejection by notices published for three days in the Official Ga-
zette and in one of the Argentine leading newspapers.
* Right to Declare Void Decisions Adopted by Shareholders' Meet-
ings: Any decision by a shareholders' meeting that violates the law,
regulations or by-laws may be challenged as being null by the share-
holders who did not vote in favor of the respective decision and by
those absent who prove their capacity as shareholders at the date of
the decision in question. 61 Shareholders who voted in favor may ob-
ject if their vote is voidable because of defects of will. It may also be
challenged by directors, statutory supervisors, members of the vigi-
59. Id. art. 246.
60. Id. art. 245.
61. See SASOT BETES, supra note 36, at 588-91.
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lance committee, or by the IGJ officers. 62 Any claim brought by per-
sons other than shareholders must be filed within three months63 of
the relevant meeting. The courts in this regard have restrictive crite-
ria to protect the shareholders' interest and the operation of the cor-
poration without damaging the shareholders' rights.64
Pre-emptive Right:65 The owners of common shares, whether single
or multiple vote shares, are entitled to a pre-emptive right to sub-
scribe additional shares offerings of the same class pro rata the num-
ber of shares held. They are also entitled to accrue pro rata the
shares they subscribe on each occasion. Please bear in mind that if
the company has gone public, the limitation set forth in section 216
of the ACL that states that no multiple vote shares will be issued
applies.
The corporation shall offer the stock to the shareholders by publish-
ing notices during three days in the Official Gazette; when corpora-
tions included in section 29966 of the ACL are involved, notices also
must be published in one of the leading Argentine newspapers.
Shareholders may exercise their pre-emptive right within thirty days
following the date on which the last notice was published, provided
that the by-laws do not stipulate a longer period. When corporations
make public offerings of stock, the extraordinary shareholders' meet-
ing may reduce this term to a ten-day minimum term, both for their
shares as well as for debentures convertible into shares. Sharehold-
ers shall also have a pre-emptive right to subscribe debentures con-
vertible into shares.
" Right to File Claims Against Directors:67 Both the company and the
shareholders individually may file claims against directors of the cor-
poration for breach of duties, violation of the law, violation of the
by-laws or other internal regulations, damages caused by willful mis-
conduct, or for abuse while in office or gross negligence. When we
refer to the company, it has to be previously resolved by a sharehold-
ers' resolution.
" Right to Obtain Copies of the Minutes of the Shareholders' Meet-
ings: 68 Any shareholder may request the board of directors, at his
own expense, a signed copy of the meeting minutes. The board has
the obligation to provide the requested copies.
" Right to Request Judicial Overseeing of the Company:69 The share-
62. ZUNINO, supra note 39, at 238.
63. Law No. 19.550, art. 251.
64. See CNCom. Room A, 87 E.D. 505 (1980); Rep L.L., XL-2432, summary 73;
CNCom. Room B, [1982-A] L.L. 82; [1981-IV] J.A. 12; 91 E.D. 492; "Vistalba S.A.
y otros c/Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires S.A.," CNCom. Room A, [1987-D] L.L.
346.
65. Law No. 19.550, arts. 194, 195.
66. See supra note 18.
67. Law No. 19.550, arts. 276, 279.
68. Id. art. 249.
69. Id. arts. 113-117.
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holders may request judicial overseeing (intervenci6n judicial)70 of
the company as a preventive measure whenever the administrators
of the company perform or omit actions that may result in serious
danger to the company. To this extent, the following conditions are
set forth: (i) his capacity as a shareholder; (ii) the existence of the
danger and its seriousness; (iii) the fact that the shareholder has ex-
hausted all remedies set forth in the by-laws; and (iv) the filing of an
action for removal of the director.
Right to Dividends: 71 The distribution of dividends or payment of
interest to shareholders are legitimate only if they arise from earned
and liquid profits corresponding to a balance sheet of a financial year
correctly drawn up and approved. It is prohibited to distribute inter-
ests or dividends (i) in advance or provisionally or (ii) stemming
from special balance sheets except in the companies covered by sec-
tion 29972 of the ACL. In all these cases the board of directors and
the members of the statutory supervisor committee are jointly and
without limit liable for such payments and distributions.
2. Rights Pertaining to Certain Shareholders in Accordance with their
Shareholdings
Shareholders representing stated percentages of the capital stock are
granted with additional rights as follows:
Percentage of
shareholding Section
required to of the
Right Description exercise the right ACL
Right to request sur- The IGJ may, upon request, exercise 10% 301
veillance by the IGJ. supervisory functions in the case of public
companies not included in article 29973 of
the ACL.
Right to request par- If a corporation is going through a liqui- 10% 107
tial distribution dur- dation procedure and liabilities were suffi-
ing the liquidation ciently guaranteed, then a partial
of the company. distribution may be made upon the
request of a shareholder.
70. Consistent with the appointment of an inspector or a co-manager.
71. Law No. 19.550, art. 224.
72. See supra note 18.
73. In this case it shall be limited to events in which the request is grounded.
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Percentage of
shareholding Section
required to of the
Right Description exercise the right ACL
Right to object to The by-laws shall specify a term dur- 5% 287
the statutory ing which the statutory supervisors are
supervisor's dis- elected to hold office that cannot
missal without exceed three financial years. Never-
cause. theless, they will remain in office until
they are replaced. Their appointment
may be revoked only by the share-
holders' meeting, which may order it
without cause, always provided that
there is no opposition filed by 5 per-
cent of the corporate capital. Any
clause contrary to these provisions is
null and void.
Right to object The liability of directors and managers 5 % 275
waiver of direc- vis-A-vis the company is extinguished
tors' or managers' by approval of their actions or by
liability, express waiver or by compromise
resolved upon by the shareholders'
meeting, provided such liability is not
due to breaches of the law, by-laws or
regulations, and provided there are no
objections from at least 5 percent of
the corporate capital.
Right to request Ordinary and extraordinary sharehold- 5% 236
the summons of a ers' meetings shall be called by the
meeting. board of directors or the statutory
supervisor in those cases provided by
law or whenever either may deem it
necessary or when so required by
shareholders representing at least 5
percent of the capital stock, provided
the by-laws do not fix a lesser per-
centage.
In the latter case, the petition will
include the agenda to be dealt with,
and the board of directors or the stat-
utory supervisor shall summon the
meeting to be held within the maxi-
mum term of forty days after the peti-
tion has been received. Should the
board of directors or statutory super-
visor fail to do so, the meeting may
be called by the IGJ or by court
order.7
4




required to of the
Right Description exercise the right ACL
Right to obtain The statutory supervisor, without det- 2% 294,
information from riment to other powers and duties sub-
the statutory provided by the ACL and conferred section
supervisor, upon him by the by-laws, shall furnish 6
shareholders, at any time required by
the latter, with information on the
subjects within his competence.
Right to report The statutory supervisor, without det- 2% 294,
irregularities. riment to other powers and duties sub-
provided by the ACL and conferred section
upon him by the by-laws, shall investi- 11
gate written complaints filed by share-
holders and mention them in an oral
report to the shareholders' meeting
with pertinent considerations and pro-
posals. He shall immediately call a
shareholders' meeting to decide on
the matter when the board of direc-
tors does not properly deal with the
situation under investigation and he
deems it necessary to proceed
urgently.
IV. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: THEIR MEETINGS
AND DUTIES
A. FUNCTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The company's administration will be in charge of a director or a board
of directors appointed by the shareholders meeting or by the vigilance
committee in accordance to the by-laws. The by-laws will set the number
of directors to be appointed. In most cases, the by-laws set a range of
directors that can be appointed (a minimum and maximum number), and
then the shareholders decide the exact number to be appointed. If the
company falls under the provisions set forth under section 299 of the
ACL,75 the board of directors must have at least three members.76 In the
event that the by-laws enable the shareholders to determine the number
of members of the board of directors, the by-laws will specify the mini-
mum and maximum allowed number of directors. Also, the by-laws
should specify the term of duration of the office of the members of the
board. Notwithstanding, it should be borne in mind that the term could
not exceed three fiscal years and that the directors will remain in office
until the new board has been appointed.77
Directors may be re-elected and once they have been appointed, they
75. See supra note 18.
76. Law No. 19.550, art. 255.
77. The fact that they should remain in office until a new board appointment is re-
solved implies that in some cases directors can exceed the three-year term estab-
lished by section 257 of the ACL. Id. art. 257.
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can only be removed exclusively by the shareholders' meeting.78 Direc-
tors do not need to be shareholders. An absolute majority of directors
must have their domicile of choice within the Republic of Argentina. 79
All directors shall establish a special domicile within Argentina where all
notices concerning the performance of their duties, including those rela-
tive to action for liability, shall be valid.
The by-laws may provide for the election of alternate directors to sub-
stitute the lack of regular directors for any reason. This provision is com-
pulsory for companies that dispense with the appointment of statutory
supervisors.
The board of directors must accept and record in the pertinent minutes
the resignation of any director at the first meeting held after it is ten-
dered, provided this does not affect its regular work and is not fraudulent
or untimely. Otherwise, the resigning director must continue in his ca-
pacity until the next shareholders' meeting decides the matter.
The by-laws must regulate the organization and working of the board
of directors. Quorum may not be less than an absolute majority of its
members. Decisions must be made by a majority, understood as the ab-
solute majority of those present, although (as we mentioned in regard to
the shareholders' resolutions regime) the by-laws can establish a more
rigorous voting regime. Those directors who have an interest contrary to
that of the company may not participate in a meeting of the board. The
board of directors shall meet at least once every three months unless the
by-laws require a greater number of meetings, without detriment to those
that may be held at the request of any director.
The position of director is personal and cannot be delegated. Directors
remain ultimately responsible. Directors cannot vote by mail, but can
empower other directors to vote on their behalf, provided that there is
quorum and their liability will be the same as that of directors present at
the meeting. 80
The board of directors of an issuing entity may conduct meetings in the
physical presence of its members or via a communications system that
provides for a simultaneous transmission of sound, images or words,
when the by-laws establishes so. The statutory supervisor committee
shall indicate the regularity of the adopted decisions. As we previously
mentioned in regard to the representation through a proxy granted in
favor of another member of the board, only present members shall be
computed as quorum unless the by-laws otherwise establishes. The by-
laws may establish that the meetings may be held at a distance. 81 The
application of these procedures recently incorporated by the TD, should
78. Id. art. 256.
79. In order to avoid any misinterpretation, it should be borne in mind that this re-
quirement only applies to the regular directors and not to the alternate directors
that will not be considered as appointed directors, unless they perform any duty on
behalf of their office.
80. Law No. 19.550, art. 266.
81. Law No. 17.811, art. 65.
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also be extended to the shareholders' meetings because the only way to
celebrate them is by the physical presence of the shareholders or by the
physical presence of someone holding a proxy. As a matter of accuracy,
the meeting procedures should ensure that votes are properly counted
and recorded, and that a timely announcement of the outcome be
made.82
According to labor and social security regulations, the relationship be-
tween the directors and the company is similar to that of an employment
contract without the element of dependence. Therefore, the director is a
corporate official who is a part of the administrative body of the
company. 83
Among the rules of the so-called "Public Offering Transparency Re-
gime," section 8 of the TD establishes that when exercising their func-
tions, directors and managers shall act in a loyal and diligent manner,
bearing in mind the following guidelines in particular:
(i) To place the corporate interests of the issuer where they perform
duties and the common interest of the shareholders above any
other interest, including the controlling shareholder's interests;
(ii) To refrain from obtaining a personal benefit from the issuer other
than the compensation paid for their functions;
(iii) To organize and implement preventive systems and mechanisms to
protect the corporate interests, thus reducing the risk of conflicts
of interests, either permanent or temporary, in the personal rela-
tionship with the issuer or with persons related to the issuer;84
(iv) To make the necessary arrangements to perform the issuer's activi-
ties and implement the necessary internal control to ensure a care-
ful management and avoid breaches of the duties established by
the regulations of the CNV and of self-regulated entities; and
(v) To act with due diligence when preparing and disclosing the infor-
mation to the market, and maintain the independence of external
auditors.
B. MANAGERS
The board of directors can designate general or special managers, who
may or not be directors. Directors will be able to delegate administrative
executive matters. At any time, these "special designations" may be re-
voked. They are responsible to the company and third parties for the
performance of their assigned duties to the same extent as the directors.8 5
82. OECD, supra note 3, at 29.
83. VERON, supra note 36, at 16.
84. This duty specifically refers to activities competing with the issuer, the use or im-
position of a lien on corporate assets, the determination of compensations or pro-
posals related thereto, the use of non-public information, the use of business
opportunities for their own benefit or for the benefit of third parties, and in gen-
eral, any situation that may generate a conflict of interests affecting the issuer.
85. Law No. 19.550, art. 270.
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The appointment of general or special managers does not exclude direc-
tors' liabilities related to their mandatory duties.
The position of the managers should not be confused with that of the
directors. The differences result from the manner of their designation,
removal, and liability. Managers are designated and removed by the
board of directors while directors are appointed and removed by the
shareholders' meeting. Further, the liability of the managers arises by the
guidelines set forth by the board of directors whose guidelines are estab-
lished by the shareholders in accordance to the by-laws of the company.
In sum, unlike directors who are officers of the company, managers are
employees.
C. DIRECTORS AND MANAGERS LIABILITY: LOYALTY AND DILIGENCE
The directors, managers, and representatives of the company must act
with loyalty and with the diligence of a good businessman. 86 The duty to
act loyally embraces a prohibition against any director competing with
the corporation. Encompassed within the standard that directors act with
the diligence of a good businessman are the requirements that directors
possess certain qualifications (e.g., technical knowledge, expertise, etc.)
and that directors perform their responsibilities in accordance with such
qualifications. 87
According to the principles of loyalty and diligence of a good business-
man, directors are unlimitedly and jointly and severally liable vis-a-vis the
company, the shareholders, and third parties for the improper perform-
ance of their office. Directors are likewise liable for breaches of the law,
by-laws or regulations, and for any damage caused by fraud, abuse of
powers or grave negligence.88
This charge of liability shall take into account individual performance
when duties have been assigned personally according to the provisions of
the by-laws, regulations or resolutions adopted by the general sharehold-
ers' meeting. A director who took part in the discussion or resolution or
was aware of it, shall be exempted from liability if he puts his protest on
record in writing and gives notice thereof to the statutory supervisor
before his liability is reported to the board of directors, the statutory su-
pervisor, the shareholders' meeting, the IGJ or before an action is
brought before the courts.
Directors and managers may be freed from liability for certain deci-
sions upon subsequent approval by the shareholders at a shareholders'
meeting, provided that such decision did not violate the law or the by-
laws and there is no objection by any shareholder representing 5 percent
86. Id. art. 59.
87. MARIANO GAGLIARDO, RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS DIRECTORES DE S.A. 570
(1994).
88. In addition to the potential civil liability faced by directors, in accordance with
sections 173 subsection 7, 300 subsection 3, and 301 of the Argentine Criminal
Code, directors who fraudulently breach their obligations may be imprisoned.
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or more of the company's capital.8 9 Directors will not be held liable for
negative downturns in the corporation's business (e.g., losses) if such con-
sequences are not a result of the directors' breach of their duties.
Although the law establishes that the liability of managers has the same
breadth as that of directors, as mentioned in the previous section, it is
important to emphasize that the liability of the managers is not several. 91'
They are governed by the general rules of agency and tort of the Argen-
tine Civil Code, as well as by the Employment Contract Law, which holds
employees liable to their employers for damages caused by fraud or gross
negligence.
V. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICABLE PRACTICES
FOR PUBLIC OFFERING COMPANIES
A. AUDITING COMMITTEE: MEMBERS AND FUNCTIONS
As we previously mentioned in section II of this article companies
making public offering of their shares of stock shall create an audit com-
mittee. The audit committee shall consist of three or more members of
the board of directors, the majority of which shall be independent pursu-
ant to the criteria established by the CNV. The auditing committee shall
have the following powers and functions:
(i) Give an opinion to the proposal of the board of directors for the
appointment of external auditors to be hired by the company,
and control their independence.
(ii) Supervise the performance of the internal control systems and of
the administrative-accounting system. Supervise the trustworthi-
ness of the administrative-accounting system, the financial infor-
mation and other relevant events submitted to the CNV, and to
self-regulated entities pursuant to the applicable information
regulations.
(iii) Supervise the application of the information policies with regard
to the company's risk management.
(iv) Provide the market complete information with regard to transac-
tions where there is conflict of interests with members of corpo-
rate bodies or controlling shareholders.
(v) Give its opinion about the reasonability of the proposals on fees
and option plans for directors or managers of the company made
by the management body.
(vi) Give its opinion about the performance of the legal requirements
and the reasonability of the conditions to issue shares or securi-
ties convertible into shares, in the case of capital increase exclud-
ing or limiting the pre-emptive right.
(vii) Verify the performance of the applicable behavior rules.
89. Law No. 19.550, art. 275.
90. RICARDO AUGUSTo NISSEN, LEY DE SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES: COMENTADA,
ANOTADA Y CONCORDADA 356 (1996).
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(viii) Give a well-founded opinion with regard to operations with re-
lated parties.
(ix) Give a well-founded opinion and communicate it to self-regulated
entities pursuant to what is determined by the CNV whenever
there is, or there may arise, a conflict of interest in the company.
Once a year, the audit committee shall prepare a plan for the fiscal
year that will be submitted to the board of directors and to the statutory
supervisor committee. The audit committee shall have access to the in-
formation and documents it may deem convenient for the performance of
its obligations.
B. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY
1. Disclosure Obligations Imposed on Certain Participants in the
Market
"A strong disclosure regime is a pivotal feature of market-based moni-
toring of companies and is central to shareholders' ability to exercise
their voting rights" and it can also "help to attract capital and maintain
confidence in the capital markets." 91 The ACL, TD, CNV, and IGJ's
rules settle the major framework of the duty to disclose.
The by-laws of companies as well as its amendments, and the board
appointments are publicly available through the IGJ. Corporations have
the mandatory duty to file with the IGJ any amendment to its by-laws 92
and any amendment in the composition of the board of directors. 93 Once
a year, non-public offering companies also have to submit their financial
statements with the IGJ. 94 Also, it is mandatory to public offering com-
panies to submit copies of quarterly financial statements and annual re-
ports, together with information about members of the board and the
statutory supervisory committee to the CNV and the relevant stock ex-
change. Pursuant to section 5 of the TD, certain officers and parties of
the companies offering securities have certain disclosure requirements to
the CNV, the stock exchange, and the public domain. This disclosure is
focused in the occurrence of "material events" (hechos relevantes) that
might affect the price of the securities or the negotiation itself. Although
the scope of "material events" is not established, the TD provides the
following events and circumstances as disclosure events:
91. OECD, supra note 3, at 29.
92. Law No. 19.550, art. 10.
93. Id. art. 60.
94. Id. art. 67.
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Disclosure to the CNV
Parties Issues to disclosure
Directors and managers of issuers making Any event or situation that, due to their
public offering of negotiable securities and importance, may substantially affect the
the members of the statutory supervisor underwriting of the negotiable securities or
committee, their negotiation.
Intermediaries authorized to act in public Any unusual event or situation that, due to
offerings, its importance, may affect the business,
responsibility or decisions with regard to
investments.
Directors, auditors, managers, and the mem- The number and class of shares of stock and
bers of the statutory supervisor committee debt bonds convertible into shares, and
(both permanent and alternate members), options of negotiable securities held by
as well as the controlling shareholders of them in any related entity.
issuers making a public offering of their
negotiable securities.
Members of the qualification council, direc- The number and classes of shares of stock,
tors, managers, auditors or members of the debt bonds or options held by them.
statutory supervision committee (either per-
manent or alternate members) of risk rating
agencies.
Directors and officers of the CNV, self-reg- The number and classes of shares of stock,
ulated entities, and securities depositories, debt bonds, and options held by them in
companies authorized to make public offer-
ings of their negotiable securities.
Any person or legal entity that, either Any transaction or group of transactions
directly or through other persons or legal made in a coordinated way.
entities, or all the persons belonging to
groups acting in a coordinated way,
purchases or sells shares of stock in a com-
pany making public offering of its negotia-
ble securities for an amount that implies
changes in the stakes held by the controlling
group or groups, and thus affecting the
structure.
Any person or entity that is not comprised The transactions that grants 5% or more of
by the above paragraph and that, either the votes for the purposes of making corpo-
directly or through other persons or legal rate decisions at general shareholders' meet-
entities, or all the persons forming groups ings.
that act in a coordinated way, purchases or
sells shares of stock of an issuer whose capi-
tal stock is comprised by the public offering
system and that grants 5% or more of the
votes for the purposes of making corporate
decisions at general shareholders' meetings.
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Disclosure to the CNV
Parties Issues to disclosure
Any entity or individual entering into share- Said agreements, understandings or changes.
holders' agreements or understandings
aimed at exercising the voting right in a
company whose shares are publicly offered
or in the company controlling it, including
but not limited to: agreements creating the
obligation to consult prior to exercising the
vote that limit the transfer of the corre-
sponding shares or negotiable securities;
granting the right to purchase or subscribe
them, or establishing the purchase of said
securities; and, in general, having as object
or effect the joint exercise of a dominant
influence in said companies or substantial
changes in the structure or power relation-
ships in the corporate governance.
The Rules of the CNV provide that the directors and statutory supervi-
sors may request the CNV to suspend their duty to disclose to the market
certain information, which may seriously affect the corporate interest.
The CNV in this case can issue a grounded decision suspending such duty
for a limited time.
The public shall be informed of the name of the negotiable security, the
amount, price, and moment when the transactions are completed on an
authorized market. Also, it must be informed of any intermediaries of
the corresponding market that have participated in the transactions and
the type of their participation. Moreover, information on stock options,
benefit plans, and remuneration paid to directors and top executives must
be informed in the prospectus when registered securities are issued. Fi-
nally, persons who, in the course of a public offering, with fraud or gross
fault, disclose false news without regard to the benefits for themselves or
for third parties or damages to third parties, including the issuer, shall be
subject to the penalties. 95 This practice known as "market price manipu-
lation" intends to (i) artificially affect the price or liquidity of the negoti-
ated volume of one or more securities or (ii) mislead any market
participant. Misleading action comprises false statement uttered knowing
its inexact or misleading nature, as well as omissions to provide essential
information when such omission may induce mistakes to third parties.
The Argentine Criminal Code states that any person who (i) maneu-
vers to raise or lower the price of stocks or public funds by means of false
news, fake negotiations or by means of an understanding among the prin-
cipal holders of goods or securities, in order not to sell or to sell at a
certain price; or (ii) publicly offers funds or securities simulating or hiding
facts or true circumstances or affirming or showing in any manner the
occurrence of false facts, shall be imprisoned for six months to two
95. These penalties are established in section 10 of the SL and its amendments, and
vary from warnings, fines up to temporal or definitive prohibitions. Law No.
17.811, supra note 26, art. 10.
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years. 96 Civil actions claiming torts could also apply based on the damage
produced.
2. Insider Trading
The basic premise of insider trading is that any person who has access
to confidential or privileged information97 due to his position, must re-
frain from trading any securities related with such information, and must
maintain reserve with respect to any information which may affect their
sale until such information is disclosed to the market. The TD98 imposes
a reserve duty to these persons.
Directors, managers, auditors, members of the statutory supervisory
committee, controlling shareholders, and professionals participating in an
entity authorized to make public offering of negotiable securities, or a
person making a bid to purchase or swap securities of an entity author-
ized to make public offering, and agents and intermediaries in the public
offering, including financial trustees, managers, and depositories of in-
vestment funds; and in general, any person who by virtue of his position
or activity has information with regard to an event that has not been pub-
licly disclosed, and that due to its importance may affect the underwriting
or negotiations of the negotiable securities in an authorized public offer-
ing or forward contracts and options, shall be strictly confidential and
shall refrain from negotiating until said information is publicly dis-
closed. 99 The Commercial Court of Appeals has considered 10) that inside
information do not need to be such that actually affects the placement of
securities or their market price, but also such that may affect its place-
ment or price. Furthermore, public officers, authority officers, and em-
ployees of risk rating agencies, and of public or private controlling
entities including the CNV, self-regulated entities and securities deposito-
ries, and any other person who, by virtue of his functions, has access to
similar information, shall hold it in confidence.
The duty of confidentiality is extended to those persons that due to a
temporary or accidental relationship with the company or with the above
mentioned persons may have access to the described information and,
additionally, to employees and third parties that due to the nature of their
functions may have had access to the information.
On July 11, 1996, through resolution 11,377 the CNV imposed a fine to
certain managers and directors of Establecimiento Modelo Terrabusi S.A.
96. Ceo. PEN. § 300.
97. Including any concrete information related to one or several securities or to one or
several issuers that has not been disclosed, and that if disclosed may substantially
affect or have affected the underwriting conditions or price or the negotiation of
said securities.
98. Decree No. 677/2001, art. 7.
99. This reflects the "abstain or disclose" rule issued by the SEC in relationship with
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (1968); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
100. "Establecimiento Modelo Terrabusi s/transferencia de paquete accionario,"
CNCom. 117 E.D. 29 (1997).
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(the Defendants). This fine was imposed due to the breach of CNV's
general resolution 227/93,101 by the performance of insider trading prac-
tices. Because the major aim of the Court of Appeals (Room A) 0 2 was
to preserve the market's transparency, it resolved the case in tile same
line of thinking of the CNV by confirming and ratifying the fine imposed
to the Defendants. The Defendants appealed the resolution of the Court
of Appeals10 3 before the Supreme Court. 1°4 After analyzing the case, the
Supreme Court revoked the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that it
was not sufficiently grounded and that some of the conclusions were
based only on assumptions10 5 that obliged the Court of Appeals to issue a
new judgment.
Although it commented on insider trading, the Supreme Court's ruling
was focused on the procedural aspects. Unfortunately, these comments
were enough to condition the Court of Appeals' (Room D) new resolu-
tion 10 6 that finally revoked the CNV's resolution 11,377 and the applica-
ble fines. This was the first case dealing with "insider trading," and it was
a great opportunity to establish a very important precedent. The only
remaining comfort after the analysis of the procedural stages is that at
least the CNV, the Court of Appeals (Room A), and the Supreme
Court's dissenting opinion agreed, although they did not impose their
way of thinking with which we agree. Sooner or later there will be a wind
of change, 10 7 and the line of thinking of this judgment will be reverted.
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance comments that:
The Principles of Corporate Governance reaffirm that it is reasona-
ble for investors to expect that the abuse of insider power be prohib-
ited. In cases where such abuses are not specifically forbidden by
legislation or where enforcement is not effective, it will be important
for governments to take measures to remove any such gaps.'0 8
101. This resolution was (i) formerly CNV's general resolution 190, and (ii) restated by
TD.
102. Acting as the appellant body of an administrative first instance.
103. It is important to point out that in this case, one of the main defensive lines was
very similar to the facts discussed in SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d. 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
104. "Establecimiento Modelo Terrabusi s/transferencia de paquete accionario," CSJN
5 E.D. 3 (2002).
105. Note that the dissenting opinion argued that the family relationship is not a minor
issue and that it should be taken into account to demonstrate the insider trading
practices based on the U.S. cases: SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(1968) and U.S. v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
106. Comisi6n Nacional de Valores c Establecimiento Modelo Terrabusi SA si Transfer-
encia paquete accionario a Nabisco, Resolution N. 11.377 CNCom. Room D, LL,
Feb. 19, 2003, 6 (1996).
107. There are many legal authors that think the same way. For example, Rodrigo S.
Luchinsky comments on the Supreme Court's resolution on Aug. 27, 2002. See
Errepar - D.S.E. N' 175, June 2002, Vol. XIV, at 265.
108. OECD, supra note 3, at 34.
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3. External Auditors
Financial statements of companies making public offerings of their se-
curities shall only be audited by accountants who have previously submit-
ted an affidavit informing the CNV of any criminal, administrative or
professional penalties previously imposed on them, except the profes-
sional ones that have been assessed as private by the competent profes-
sional council. Such information shall be permanently updated by the
interested parties and shall be disclosed to the public through the proce-
dures established by the regulations of the CNV.
The shareholders' general meeting, when approving the financial state-
ments, shall appoint independent chartered accountants to be in charge
of the external audit corresponding to the new fiscal year. At any time,
the shareholders' meeting may revoke the appointment when there are
enough reasons. If the administration body makes the appointment pro-
posal, the audit committee shall analyze it just as if the same body recom-
mends the revocation of their duties.
C. CORPORATE CONTROL
1. Anti-Takeover Devices
Neither the ACL nor the TD or other rules expressly address anti-take-
over devices. Common practice defensive measures, however, include: (i)
provisions within the by-laws restricting share transfers;10 9 (ii) sharehold-
ers' agreements; (iii) increased quorum and supermajority requirements
for shareholder meetings; (iv) issuance of participation bonds or non-vot-
ing shares; (v) golden parachutes; (vi) poison pills; (vii) staggered term
boards; and (viii) scorched-earth defense.1 10 We will not refer in detail to
these practices because they are very well known and they are not the
core subjects of this paper.
2. Public Offering
In addition, the TD establishes that a public offering of voting shares of
a company, whose shares are available on a public offering system, shall
be addressed to all holders of said shares. In the case of binding offer-
ings, the public offering of voting shares shall further include the holders
of (1) subscription rights or stock options, and (2) convertible debt securi-
ties or other similar securities that in a direct or indirect way may grant a
109. Share-transfer restrictions are allowed provided that they are expressly contem-
plated in the by-laws (which imply that is known by all the parties related to the
company) and that they do not entail outright prohibitions to transfer such shares.
The implementation of such restrictions is generally vested on the board.
110. According to the AAII Journal, published in Chicago in 1986 by the American
Association of Individual Investors, this is a tactic in which the defending com-
pany's management engages in practices that reduce their company's value to such
a degree that it is no longer attractive to the potential acquirer. It is important to
point out that this practice, as well as any other intent by the board to stop a take-
over bid, would be in the interest of the company. Otherwise, they could be acting
only for their own purposes.
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subscription, acquisition or conversion right on voting shares proportion-
ate to their holdings and in the amount of the holding to be acquired. 1
3. Binding Public Offering and Significant Stake
The person or entity who, with the intention to obtain direct or indirect
control of a company whose shares are admitted by the public offering
system, proceeds to acquire - acting individually or in agreement with
other persons, in a unique act or successive acts - for valuable considera-
tion a number of voting shares of subscription rights, stock options, con-
vertible debt securities or other similar securities directly or indirectly
granting a subscription, acquisition or conversion right on voting shares
or a "significant stake" (e.g., 35 percent) in the corporate capital shall
previously carry out a binding public offer or securities swap. The bind-
ing system, however, shall not apply to the acquisition of shares or other
securities as long as, as a whole they do not exceed such "significant
stake." Neither shall apply in the cases where a change of control takes
place as a consequence of the company's restructure, merger or spin-off.
The TD also introduced a system of residual stakes, 112 which apply to
all listed companies. This system establishes that when a shareholder, ei-
ther directly or though one or more controlled companies holds 95 per-
cent or more of the subscribed capital (the so called "almost total
control"), he is obliged upon the request of any minority shareholder to
make an offer to purchase all of its shares. In addition, within a six-
month term from the date when a person obtained the company's "al-
most total control," the person may issue a unilateral statement of its
decision to acquire the total remaining corporate shares held by third
parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
The set of rules required to have a complete corporate governance
framework has already been enacted. All the relevant OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance are included in the Argentine legal framework.
Only some operational rules of minor importance have not been incorpo-
rated. Although the rules are sufficient, the belief that enactment of new
rules can improve markets remains to be a problem of considerable im-
portance. To the contrary, however, new rules only provide a continuous
basis of change, thus frightening investors.
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance further provide that:
Of particular relevance is the relation between corporate governance
practices and the increasingly international character of invest-
ment .... If the countries are to reap the full benefits of the global
111. The major aim of these provision set forth by the TD is the equal treatment among
shareholders, both as to economic and financial conditions and as to any other
acquisition condition for all shares, securities or rights of the same category or
class.
112. Decree 677/2001, §§ 25-28.
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capital market, and if they are to attract long-term "patient" capital,
corporate governance arrangements must be credible and well un-
derstood across borders.1 13
Yet, significant structural issues remain unresolved. Backlogs and poor
judicial systems, as well as the implementation, effectiveness, and en-
forcement of the new laws and regulations remain untested." 14
Unfortunately, standards or rules alone are insufficient if they are not
supported by the right culture, ethics, and professionalism. 15 On the in-
ternational field, Enron and WorldCom were horrible corporate govern-
ance failures.116 This proves that no country is exempt. Although
Argentina is in the right path with it's intent to enter into the globalized
market," 7 many things still have to be done, including a departure from a
vigorous enforcement of the law. Argentina requires a well-functioning
judicial system to provide efficient remedies and rational outcomes. The
piercing of the corporate veil by the Labor Court of Appeals in the Del-
gadillo Linares, Adela c/Shatell SA y otros s/Despido and Duquelsy, Silvia
c Fuar SA y otro cases as well as the lack of punishment to the insider
traders in the Establecimiento Modelo Terrabusi sitransferencia de pa-
quete accionario case are clear examples of legal risks that undermine
legal certainty.
113. OECD, supra note 3, at 12.
114. Global Investing: Be Nice to Minorities in Latin America, FIN. TIMES, July 23, 2001,
at 20. Moreover, The Economist anticipated what would happen in Argentina in
the event that stricter standards were adopted: "Draft guidelines drawn up by the
OECD and Brazil, Chile and Argentina propose strict new standards for multina-
tional firms in areas such as the environment and corporate governance. Even if
approved, they will be hard to enforce in emerging economies." Business This
Week, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2000, at 7.
115. BERGHE & RIDDER, supra note 5, at 20.
116. William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors got Taken for
Trillions by Corporate Insiders - The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 69 (2002).
117. For example, Argentina had celebrated an inter-agency memoranda of under-
standing with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission for the provision of recip-
rocal assistance in obtaining documentary and testimonial evidence. In 1988, the
U.S. Congress passed the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act,
which allows the Commission to assist foreign securities authorities with their in-
vestigations even when no violations of U.S. laws are at stake. David. M. Stuart &
Charles F. Wright, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Advancing the SEC's Ability to Obtain
Foreign Audit Documentation in Accounting Fraud Investigations, 2002 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 749 (2002).
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